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Abstract
We study bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining between firms and
unions in a Cournot duopoly. Incentive delegation creates frictions for each party between
its objectives of within-firm rent extraction and market/job stealing from the rival firm. The
net effect is restraint in production resulting in a larger bargaining pie. But each player’s
payoff will be inversely related to his bargaining power. We also show that if players are
given a choice to delegate, they will not resort to delegation when their bargaining power is
sufficiently high. This is in contrast to the scenarios commonly assumed in many models.
JEL Classifications: J50, L13, D43.
Key Words: Managerial incentives, efficient bargaining, bilateral delegation, implicit
collusion, job stealing
∗School of Economics, University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia; Email:
Ishita.Chatterjee@uwa.edu.au
†Corresponding author; Durham University Business School, University of Durham, Durham, U.K. DH1 3LB;
E-mail: b.c.saha@durham.ac.uk
1 INTRODUCTION
It is well known that firms may delegate their output decisions to managers inducing them to
maximize sales rather than profit in order to steal business from their rivals (Vickers, 1985;
Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987). The idea of advantage-seeking delegation, and par-
ticularly the strategic overproduction aspect of it, recur through many themes of the industrial
organization literature (see, for instance, Zhang and Zhang (1997), Lambertini and Trombetta
(2002), Mujumdar and Pal (2007) and Mukherjee and Tsai (2014)), and also feature in other
areas like development economics (Basu et al., 1997) and strategic trade theory (Das, 1997).
However, when the strategic delegation model has been extended to wage bargaining (Szyman-
ski, 1994) it is seen that managers may not always maximize sales, because their incentive to
steal business from the rival firm comes into a conflict with the union’s wage demand.
But delegation has generally been modeled as a unilateral act, mainly occurring on the firm
side, and therefore the inherent conflicts in managerial incentives have not been studied in full
scale. Even in standard wage bargaining models, barring a few exceptions such as Jones (1989a),
unions don’t delegate the task of negotiation to the union leader.1 In reality negotiation between
the firm and its workers is always mediated by a union leader and a manager, and the manager
also doubles as the decision maker for the firm’s output market activities. Chatterjee and Saha
(2013) allow bilateral delegation in wage bargaining; but their model is restricted to monopoly
and hence, no strategic considerations could be accommodated.2
This paper permits delegation on both sides – the firm and the union – and studies its
implication for duopoly competition as well as rent allocation within the framework of efficient
wage bargaining. While both sides have a shared interest in stealing business and jobs from
the rival firm, they are at conflict within the firm. We aim to study how delegation strikes a
balance here. Furthermore, while the existing models assume exogenous delegation, this paper
suggests one way of making the delegation decision endogenous. Therefore, not only do we study
conflicts in incentives on either side of the bargaining table, but also examine if the players wish
to avoid this ex post incentive conflict by simply not delegating in the first place.
Our main result is that bilateral delegation diffuses ‘strategic aggression’ and avoids over-
production, which in turn enlarges the firm surplus, and both firms move toward a cooperative
outcome without any overt or tacit collusion. Unions also benefit by gaining a larger share of
the organizational rent. But this mutually beneficial outcome may be attained at a cost – the
bargaining power of each side exerting a negative effect on its payoff. That is to say, delegation
fully undermines the institutionally determined bargaining powers by overturning the rules of
rent sharing – allowing the weaker party to get a larger share of the pie, through aggressively
incentivizing its delegate.
The explanation is as follows. In delegating the task of bargaining the shareholders face
1Jones’s (1989a) main objective is to show that delegation to a union leader is tantamount to making com-
mitment.
2Jones (1989b) also consider bilateral delegation in a pure bargaining environment; but his concerns are
different.
two conflicting incentives. On the one hand, they would like to steal market and hence need
to encourage their manager to expand production by ‘undervaluing’ the marginal cost (which
depends on the reservation wage). But on the other hand, they also want to increase their
share of the organizational rent and hence expect the manager to reduce the wage bill, which
in turn requires him to ‘overvalue’ the reservation wage and curb production. The first motive
is the strategic motive, and it calls for a sales-oriented incentive scheme. The second motive is
the bargaining motive, which calls for a profit-oriented incentive scheme. That which scheme
will be chosen and which motive will dominate depends on how powerful the shareholders are
vis-a-vis the workers. Greater the bargaining power of the shareholders, stronger their strategic
motive. The reason is that a stronger firm can appropriate a greater share of the organizational
surplus, and hence its returns to strategic actions are greater. By the same logic, smaller the
bargaining power, weaker the strategic motive and stronger the bargaining motive.
The workers will also face two conflicting incentives. They share a similar strategic motive
in stealing jobs from the rival firm. This requires inducing the union leader to ‘undervalue’ the
reservation wage and maximize the gross wage bill. Yet at the same time they would like to
press for a higher wage, which can be achieved if the union leader ‘overvalues’ the reservation
wage and is geared towards net wage bill maximization. The job-stealing motive dominates
when the workers have high bargaining power.
Since the bargaining power of the two parties are inversely related and the relative returns
to the two objectives are different to them. Within a given firm, the weaker party’s bargaining
motive will counteract the strategic motive of the stronger party. The weaker party would try
to reduce production, while the stronger party would like to expand production. In effect, the
strategic aggression is diffused, production of each firm is restricted and their surplus increases
from the standard duoply level. When both sides are nearly equally powerful, two conflicting
incentives are in balance, and production is reduced to the collusive level. Organizational surplus
in each firm reaches its maximum.
This contradicts the over-expansion result of the strategic delegation models like Fershtman
and Judd (1987). The reason is that with only firm-side delegation and no within firm bargain-
ing, the firm’s strategic motive goes overboard and in equilibrium both firms excessively produce
and lose profit? In the presence of bilateral delegation, a weaker player controls the strategic
aggression of its bargaining rival.3 Thus, by appointing a delegate and endowing him with a
different objective function, the weaker party can threaten to punish strategic overproduction
and thus restrain the market stealing or job stealing motive of its stronger rival.
These results are established with general demand and cost functions in a duopoly setup.
With the help of an example involving linear demand and constant returns to scale technology
we also show that the distribution of the organizational pie does not align with the distribution
of the bargaining power. In fact, the payoff of a given party will be inversely related to its
3Fershtman and Judd (1987) observed that if incentive delegation occurs in a price competition model then
firms move toward collusion. But in a model of quantity competition, as Szymanski (1994) has shown, the
presence of a third party, like a labor union would discipline the firm. However, he assumes ‘right-to-manage’
protocol and no delegation on the union side.
2
bargaining power. By appointing a delegate and incentivizing him for hard bargaining a weaker
party can extract greater concession from its opponent, and thus the payoff-power relationship
is reversed.
In Chatterjee and Saha (2013) as well, which also deals with bilateral delegation, but only
under monopoly, the conventional payoff-power relationship breaks down. In the absence of any
strategic objectives, the sole purpose of delegation is to fare well in bargaining. So a weaker
party counters its opponent by providing stronger incentives to its delegate, and succeeds in
increasing its share of the organizational pie. However, the pie itself changes with incentives.
In monopoly, both sides will always incentivize their delegates to ‘overvalue’ their own costs;
the firm resorts to profit oriented delegation, and the union resorts to net wage bill oriented
delegation. This leads to substantial production losses from the no-delegation monopoly level.
In contrast, in the duopoly model, as the strategic motive also comes into play the extent
of bargaining motivated incentives gets moderated. So we have a range of possibilities starting
from the firm trying to maximize sales, while the union trying to maximize the net wage bill,
to the other extreme where the firm is trying to maximize profit and the union is trying to
maximize the gross wage bill. Moreover, with an example we show that the organizational
pie will always be greater than the duopoly no-delegation pie. Thus, it seems that bilateral
delegation is potentially beneficial to the firm and the union jointly.
Finally, we extend the game to see if the players were given a choice, whether they would
really choose to delegate. While a fully non-cooperative extension of the game is fairly complex
and beyond the scope of the paper, we propose a simple semi-collusive variant of it to restrict
our attention to the symmetric delegatin decisions (which we explain in Section 3.2). It turns
out that delegation is a dominant strategy for both sides only if their bargaining powers are not
highly uneven. But if they are, the stronger party will choose not to delegate giving rise to an
asymmetric delegation scenario with only the weaker party resorting to (bargaining) delegation.
This gives rise a different scenario to the ones, commonly appearing in the literature.
There is some empirical evidence of profit orientation in managerial incentive schemes. In
a US medical industry report Kasinec (2006) writes that managers are discouraged to hire
more staff or pay more wages by linking their bonuses mainly to companies’ annual profit and
annual productivity growth targets. There is also an established literature that studies CEO
and managerial compensation in the presence of unions. Singh and Agarwal (2002) showed that
in the Canadian manufacturing sector union presence is associated with greater CEO pay. On
the issue of union facilitating implicit collusion one finds some indirect evidence from Haskel
and Martin (1992), who observed in the context of Britain that union membership positively
affects the price-cost mark-up via industry concentration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the main results for
general demand and cost conditions. Section 3 studies linear demand and constant returns
technology to present some simulation results, and also models endogenous delegation. Section
4 concludes.
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2 THE MODEL
There are two identical firms, indexed 1 and 2. Labor, for simplicity, is the only input needed
for production which is given by the technology q = q(l). Assuming a concave production
function q = q(l), we write the sales revenue of the i-th firm as si = si(l1, l2), which is strictly
concave with the following restrictions:
Assumption 1 ∂si∂lj < 0,
∂2si
∂l2i
< 0, ∂
2si
∂li∂lj
< 0 for i 6= j.
The first restriction signifies that the two goods are substitutes – perfect or imperfect; the
second restriction relates to concavity and the third restriction ensures that employments are
strategic substitutes.
The shareholders of firm i hire a manager and offer an incentive scheme zi, which is, as
in Fershtman and Judd (1987) (in short FJ), a linear combination of sales si and profit pii as
follows.
zi = βipii + (1− βi)si(.) = si(.) − βiwili. (1)
Non-trivial delegation arises if βi 6= 1, and there are two types of delegation that can arise –
sales oriented delegation (i.e. βi < 1), and profit oriented delegation (i.e. βi > 1). Shareholders
maximize profit pii = si(.) −wili.
The workers’ union in firm i consists of Ni identical workers whose reservation wage is θ
and the objective function is ui = (wi − θ)li. At the worker selection stage, li members are
randomly hired and the remaining (Ni− li) members receive the reservation wage from outside.
Workers in each firm appoint a union leader who is asked to maximize:
vi = γiui(.) + (1− γi)wili = wili − γiθli. (2)
Delegation is captured by γi 6= 1. If γi > 1 the union leader is oriented to net wage bill
maximization as opposed to γi < 1 when he is oriented to gross wage bill maximization.
4
Effectively, the leader is induced to overvalue (γi > 1) or undervalue (γi < 1) the opportunity
cost of the union.
Each firm’s wage and employment are an outcome of Nash bargaining between the firm
manager and the union leader. In both firms, the bargaining power of the union leader (and also
the union) is exogenously given by α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and the manager’s (and also the shareholders’)
bargaining power is (1− α). The reservation payoffs of all parties are zero.
In stage 1 of the game the shareholders choose βi and simultaneously the unions choose
respective γi. In stage 2 wage and employment (and consequently output) are determined.
4It is conceivable that the union leader might be encouraged to negotiate for higher employment. For example,
the leader might be assigned an objective function vi = (wi − θ)li + γili = wili − (θ− γ)li. The analysis will be
qualitatively similar.
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2.1 Optimal Incentives
We start from stage 2 of the game. Given (β1, γ1), (β2, γ2) the manager and the union leader
in each firm simultaneously bargain over their firm-specific wage and employment. The Nash
bargaining problem is to maximize Bi = vi(wi, li)
αzi(wi, li)
(1−α) with respect to (wi, li).
The solution is given by the following two equations.
∂si(li, lj)
∂li
= βiγiθ, i = 1, 2 (3)
wi = (1− α)γiθ+ α
si
βili
, i = 1, 2. (4)
Solving (3) for firm 1 and 2 simultaneously we obtain the employment functions li =
li(β1γ1, β2γ2), i = 1, 2 and substituting them in (4) we obtain wi = wi(l1, l2). Further, it
is easy to check that ∂li∂βi < 0,
∂li
∂γi
< 0 and ∂li∂βj > 0
∂li
∂γj
> 0, i 6= j.
After substituting (4) and rearranging terms we can write profit and union utility respec-
tively in the following way:
pii = si
(
1−
α
βi
)
− (1− α)θγili = (si − θli) − α(
si
β
− θγili) − (γi − 1)θli (5)
ui =
(
si
α
βi
+ (1− α)θγili
)
− θli = α(
si
β
− θγili) + (γi − 1)θli (6)
Eq. (5) shows how profit is obtained after subtracting the wage bill from the bargaining pie
[si−θli]. If there were no delegation, we would have had pii = (1−α)[si−θli] and ui = α[si−θli].
But with delegation the payoffs change, about which we make the following observations.
1. For firm i’s profit to be positive, optimal βi must exceed α. To be more precise, the
following inequality must hold
βi >
α
1− (1− α)θγi
li
si
.
2. If bargaining was the sole objective of delegation, the shareholders would set βi > 1 (i.e.
profit orientation, rather than sales orientation) and the union would set γi > 1 (i.e net
wage bill orientation). But in the presence of a strategic motive, this would imply giving
away a share of the market to the rival firm, as we shall shortly see.
3. Delegation can guarantee a strictly positive payoff for either side even when a given side
has the least bargaining power: pii(α = 1) > 0 if βi > 1 and u(α = 0) > 0 if γi > 1. Thus,
delegation acts as a substitute for low bargaining power.
Now let us derive the optimal incentives by considering the stage 1 problem. Given (γi, βj, γj)
shareholders in firm i maximize Eq. (5). The first order condition for profit maximization is
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(after substituting (3)) for i = 1, 2, and i 6= j
∂pii
∂βi
=
1
β2i
{β2i (βi − 1)γiθ} ∂li∂βi + αsi︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ (1− α
βi
)
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂βi︸ ︷︷ ︸ = 0, (7)
Bargaining effect (> 0) Strategic effect (< 0)
The first term of Eq. (7) captures the bargaining effect of delegation. The second term is
the duopoly induced strategic effect. The negative strategic effect encourages the shareholders
to lower β while the positive bargaining effect encourages to raise it.
Similarly, by maximizing the union’s utility as given in (6) for any given (βi, βj, γj), we
derive the first order condition as
∂ui
∂γi
= θ
(γi − 1) ∂li
∂γi
+ (1− α)li︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ α
βi
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂γi︸ ︷︷ ︸ = 0. (8)
Bargaining effect (> 0) Strategic effect (< 0)
The strategic effect is negative also for the union; but it is also directly related to their
bargaining power. If their bargaining power weakens, the strategic effect of their delegation will
also weaken.
Unilateral delegation by shareholders. Suppose the unions do not delegate (γi = γj =
1); only the shareholders do. This case is of particular interest for the strategic delegation result
popularized by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987). Not only do
we generalize the strategic delegation models to wage bargaining, but also present an efficient
bargaining version of Szymanski (1994).
Set γi = 1 in Eq. (7) and suppose β
∗
1 = β
∗
2 = β
∗ satisfy Eq. (7) for i = 1, 2.5 The following
can be said about β∗ unambiguously.
Proposition 1 ( Unilateral delegation by shareholders ) Denote β∗(α = 0) = βS and
β∗(α = 1) = βB. Then βS < 1 < βB, and β∗ ′(α) > 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, there exists a
unique critical value of α, say α^ ∈ (0, 1), such that at all α ∈ (α^, 1] delegation is profit oriented
(β∗ > 1), at all α ∈ [0, α^) delegation is sales-oriented ( α < β∗ < 1), and at α = α^ there is
effectively no delegation (β∗ = 1).
Proposition 1 shows that sales-orientation, which commonly features in strategic delegation
models, should not be taken for granted. Sales-orientation occurs only when unions have no
or little bargaining power6. Particularly at α = 0 the FJ model is replicated. With stronger
5For this solution to be valid we assume that the Cournot stability condition holds along with the second
order condition for each firm’s profit maximization.
6Szymanski (1994) has shown a similar result for right-to-manage wage bargaining.
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unions, delegation becomes profit-oriented and the Cournot outputs move in the direction of
the collusive output.
Unilateral delegation by the union. Now assume that only the unions delegate. Set
β1 = β2 = 1 in Eq. (8). Again consider a symmetric solution to Eq. (8) γ
∗
1 = γ
∗
2 = γ
∗.7
Proposition 2 ( Unilateral delegation by unions ) Denote γ∗(α = 1) = γS and γ∗(α =
1) = γB. Then γS < 1 < γB, and γ∗ ′(α) < 0 for α ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, there exists a unique
critical value of α, α˜ ∈ (0, 1), such that at all α ∈ (α˜, 1] there is γ∗ < 1 signifying gross wage
bill oriented delegation, and at all α ∈ [0, α˜) we have γ∗ > 1 signifying net wage bill orientation.
At α = α˜, γ∗ = 1.
The nature of delegation for the union is similar to that of shareholders. In this sense, Propo-
sition 2 produces a dual of Szymanski (1994) result. Over-employment (or under-employment)
is not exclusive to shareholders delegation. We also note that the union’s incentives are similar
to, but not an exact mirror image of, the shareholders’ incentives. For example, when α = 0
unions’ delegation is completely devoid of any strategic motive (see Eq. (8)). In contrast, when
α = 1 the shareholder’s strategic motive does not fully disappear; see Eq. (7).
A particular implication of symmetry between the unions’ strategic interest and the share-
holders’ strategic interest is that their incentive terms would be exactly identical, when they
have the maximum bargaining power. The reason is that when a party is most powerful and it
is the only side delegating, its sole objective of delegation is strategic, i.e. to steal market or
jobs from its rival by aggressively expanding its own.
To see this, substitute α = 0 and γ = 1 in Eq. (7). This gives
∂pii
∂βi
= (βi − 1)θ
∂li
∂βi
+
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂βi
= 0.
Next, substitute α = 1 and β = 1 in Eq. (8) and obtain
∂ui
∂γi
= (γi − 1)θ
∂li
∂γi
+
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂γi
= 0.
These two equations are exactly mirror images of each other with γi and βi swapping their
places. So the optimal βi(α = 0) must be equal to optimal γi(α = 1).
Proposition 3 (Symmetric strategic incentives) Suppose α = 0 and γi = 1 (i = 1, 2) are
exogenously given, and βS is the symmetric optimal incentive of the shareholders. Similarly,
suppose α = 1 and βi = 1 (i = 1, 2) are exogenously given, and γ
S is the symmetric optimal
incentive of the unions. Then it must be that βS = γS.
Bilateral delegation. We now turn to bilateral delegation and consider Eqs. (7) and (8)
7Symmetry is not essential for the results stated in the proposition. But it helps to establish monotonicity
and comparative statics. The same argument applies to unilateral delegation by the shareholders.
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together. We assume that all the second order conditions hold including the Cournot stability
condition and a symmetric solution (β, γ) exists.8 β(α) and γ(α) are continuous.
One important question in this context is whether the joint incentive term βγ (rather than
β and γ independently) will exceed or fall short of 1. If βγ > 1, we will have underproduction
relative to the duopoly level, whereas βγ < 1 will give overproduction. However, Eqs. (7)
and (8) do not directly give us any indication about the magnitude of βγ. Nevertheless, it is
apparent that both the union and the shareholders commonly recognize the strategic effects
of their incentive schemes. Therefore, despite their conflicting bargaining interests they would
be able to ‘implicitly coordinate’ their choices to have a mutually beneficial effect on their
bargaining pie.
Eqs. (7) and (8) can be utilized to derive the following equation that reconstructs the total
effect of joint incentives from the individual player’s incentive choice:
βiγi
(βiγi − 1)θ ∂li
∂βiγi︸ ︷︷ ︸+
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂βiγi︸ ︷︷ ︸+
wili
βiγi︸ ︷︷ ︸
 = 0. (9)
(< 0) (< 0) (> 0)
The first term (inside the bracket) is the effect of an increase in the joint incentive (βiγi) on the
organizational surplus [si(li, lj)−θli] occurring through own employment li. The second term is
the strategic effect on the organizational surplus occurring through the rival firm’s employment.
The third term is the ‘incentive adjusted’ wage bill, which is also an ‘approximate’ sum of the
direct effects of βi and γi on profit and union utility.
9
In sum, the first two terms are the indirect effects, occurring through li and lj respectively,
and the third term is the direct effect. It is also the case that the direct effect is positive; the
strategic effect is negative due to ∂si/∂lj < 0. So the sign of the first term depends on the
relative strengths of the second and the third term, i.e. the strategic and the direct effects.
If the direct effect dominates the strategic effect, then the first term must be negative, which
requires βiγi to exceed 1 (because
∂li
∂βiγi
< 0). Intuitively, if the strategic effect is relatively
weak, markets or job stealing will not be easy. The players then can benefit by focussing on
bargaining, and therefore enlarge the bargaining pie by restraining their production below the
duopoly level by setting βiγi > 1. On the other hand, if the strategic effect is greater than the
direct effect, the players will be more concerned about losing market to their rival. In that case,
they will set βiγi < 1 and will expand their output beyond the standard duopoly level.
Proposition 4 ( Bilateral delegation and strategic underproduction) (i) Suppose (βi, γi),
i = 1, 2, is a Nash equilibrium. Then for sufficiently small α, we have βi < 1 and γi > 1. Con-
versely, for sufficiently high α we have βi > 1 and γi < 1.
8For economy reasons these details are omitted here.
9It can be seen that, if li and lj are held unchanged, we have
∂pii
∂βi
βi = α
si
βi
,
∂ui
∂γi
γi = (1 − α)θγi, and
∂pii
∂βi
βi +
∂ui
∂γi
γi = wili.
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(ii) Given any α ∈ [0, 1], βiγi > 1 if and only if
wili > |
∂si
∂lj
|
∂lj
∂βiγi
βiγi, i 6= j. (10)
It is worthwhile to note that for Proposition 4 we have not imposed symmetry; in fact, to
separate out the strategic effect from the own employment effect it is essential to include the
subscripts i and j.
Suppose in a symmetric incentive equilibrium strategic underproduction occurs in both firms.
Consequently, the organizational surplus or the bargaining pie will be larger than the duopoly
level, giving rise to the possibility that both parties can be better off. In that case, the findings
of the strategic delegation models and bargaining models are either contradicted or modified
(Fershtman and Judd,1987; Jones, 1989b; Szymnaski, 1997). Further, if the bargaining pie gets
bigger, can it reach its maximum size, which is otherwise achievable only under a cartel? We
try to answer this question next.
2.2 Bargaining Pie
The question of how the size of the bargaining pie is affected can be broken into two parts.
How does the bargaining pie of firm i change with the joint incentive βiγi, and how does
the bargaining pie of firm i change when the bargaining power of the union change? The
first question requires holding firm j’s incentives unchanged. But the second question requires
accounting for changes in both βiγi and βjγj in response to a change in the exogenous parameter
α. So the second question is essentially about the comparative statics on the equilibrium
incentive.
Let us begin with the first question. Noting that the bargaining pie of firm i (Pi = si − θli)
depends on the incentive terms only indirectly via employment, we derive (with the help of Eq.
(3))
∂(si − θli)
∂βiγi
= (βiγi − 1) θ
∂li
∂βiγi
+
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂βiγi
< 0.
Now notice that these two terms appear in Eq. (9), and since the third term in (9) is strictly
positive, the sum of the above two terms must be negative; otherwise Eq. (9) will not be
satisfied, which has been derived from the shareholders’ and the workers’ respective payoff
maximization. Then it can be said that a unilateral increase in the joint incentives of firm i
will reduce its own bargaining pie. This is so, because in duopoly raising incentives unilaterally
implies losing market to its rival.
But that is only a part of the story. When an exogenous factor commonly affects the bargain-
ing environments of both firms, and both firms symmetrically reset the equilibrium incentives,
the bargaining pie of a given firm will face opposite effects from its own joint incentives and the
joint incentives of its rival. Our second question directly relates to this. To analyze the effect
of an increase in α, we make a regulatory assumption.
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Assumption 2 | ∂li∂xi | > |
∂li
∂xj
| for i 6= j, where x represents a generic variable affecting employ-
ment.
This assumption states that the impact of firm i’s action (represented by xi) on its own
employment will be stronger than the impact of the rival firm’s action. With the help of this
assumption and assuming symmetry we derive the effect of α on a given firm’s bargaining pie.10
P ′i(α) =
[
(βγ− 1)θ+
∂si
∂lj
]
∂(βγ)
∂α
[
∂li
∂(βiγi)
+
∂li
∂(βjγj)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸ . (11)
< 0 by Assumption 2
In Eq. (11) the sign of the overall expression depends on the first two terms. The sign of
∂(βγ)/∂α is ambiguous; in any case, if it is not zero, then our attention should be devoted to
the first term. In a symmetric equilibrium when the bargaining pie is maximum in both firms,
we must have the first term zero (given ∂(βγ)/∂α 6= 0). That is,
βγ = 1−
1
θ
∂si
∂lj
for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (12)
The second order condition confirms that the bargaining pie will be maximum11. Since
∂si
∂lj
< 0, βγ must be greater than 1. The largest pie is nothing but the collusive pie.
We show in Appendix that there exists a unique solution Eq. (12). Let this value of βγ be
denoted as k, which will also be same regardless of delegation being one-sided or two-sided.
Payoffs: A related question is how the firm’s (and union’s) payoff is related to its bargaining
power. In the general case, the effect of the union bargaining power α on firm profit is ambiguous,
for similar reasons explained in Chatterjee and Saha (2013). There are usually two effects of an
increase in α on the firm’s profit. First is the direct effect, which is negative. Then there are
two countervailing effects, one occurring through the union’s incentive term γi and the other
10We write
P ′i(α) =
(
∂si
∂li
− θ
)[
∂li
∂(βiγi)
∂(βiγi)
∂α
+
∂li
∂(βjγj)
∂(βjγj)
∂α
]
+
∂si
∂lj
[
∂lj
∂(βiγi)
∂(βiγi)
∂α
+
∂lj
∂(βjγj)
∂(βjγj)
∂α
]
.
Use symmetry ∂l1
∂β1γ1
= ∂l2
∂β2γ2
and ∂l2
∂β1γ1
= ∂l1
∂β2γ2
, and β1γ1 = β2γ2 to derive (11).
11We evaluate the second order condition at the maximum. First note that
∂2si
∂lj∂βiγi
=
 ∂s
2
i
∂lj∂li
+
∂s2i
∂l2j︸ ︷︷ ︸

 ∂li∂(βiγi) + ∂li∂(βjγj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
 > 0, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2.
< 0 < 0
In the above, we have used the assumption of symmetry to write ∂(βiγi)
∂α
=
∂(βjγj)
∂α
and ∂li
∂(βiγi)
=
∂lj
∂(βjγj)
,
∂lj
∂(βiγi)
= ∂li
∂(βjγj)
. This allows us to derive
P ′′i (α) =
θ + ∂2si
∂lj∂βiγi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∂(βiγi)
∂α
)2  ∂li
∂(βiγi)
+
∂li
∂(βjγj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
 < 0.
> 0 < 0
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occurring through the rival shareholders’ incentive term βj. Both effects are positive. Hence,
the overall effect is ambiguous in all scenarios of delegation. Similar ambiguity arises also with
unions’ utilities. Given this complexity, we now consider an example to get a clear picture.
Now we would like to investigate with an example at what α we can arrive at the solution
βγ = k. The example will also help us ascertain how the payoffs vary with α.
3 LINEAR DEMAND AND CONSTANT RETURNS TECH-
NOLOGY
Suppose the two goods are homogenous and the demand curve is linear as p = a − q1 − q2;
production exhibits constant returns to scale and qi = li. Assume that a < 6θ. The second
stage output and wage of a firm resulting from efficient bargaining are ( for i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2)
li =
a− 2βiγiθ+ βjγjθ
3
, wi = (1− α)γiθ+ α
[a+ θ(βiγi + βjγj)]
3βi
.
We may also note that p = (a+ θ(βiγi + βjγj)]/3] and θγi < wi < pi/βi.
Now consider the firms’ optimal incentives. Profit in firm i is given as,
pii =
[
[a+ θ(βiγi + βjγj)]
3
(βi − α)
βi
− (1− α)θγi
]
(a− 2βiγiθ+ βjγjθ)
3
, i 6= j.
Maximizing pii we obtain the shareholders’ (implicit) reaction function (for i 6= j)
∂pii
∂βi
=
1
9β2i
[
4γiβ
2
iθ
2
{
6γiθ− a− βjγjθ
4θ
− βiγi
}
+ α
{
(a+ βjγjθ)
2 − 4β2iγ
2
iθ
2
}]
= 0.
Similarly, the union’s utility in firm i is
ui =
(a− 2βiγiθ+ βjγjθ)
3
[
α
3βi
{a+ θβiγi + θγjβj}− θ{1− (1− α)γi}
]
.
The first order condition for maximization is
∂ui
∂γi
=
1
9
[(a+ βjγjθ)(3− 4α) + 6βiθ− 4(3− 2α)βiθγi] = 0.
We assume there is a symmetric solution, βi = βj = β and γi = γj = γ. The symmetric
solution simplifies the first order conditions as
∂pi
∂β
= β2γθ [6γθ− a− 5βγθ] + α
[
(a+ βγθ)2 − 4β2γ2θ2
]
= 0, (13)
∂u
∂γ
= (a− βγθ)(3− 4α) + 6βθ(1− γ) = 0. (14)
Several observations can be made from the above two equations.
1. For outputs to be positive we must have a > βγθ. For restriction on β consider Eq. (13),
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a
10.420
0.125
Pie
Collusion
Only shareholders delegate
Only union delegates
Both delegate
Figure 1. Bargaining pie for a firm in duopoly
4/5
0.12485
1/4
0.08
0.111
No delegation
3/40.22
0.2
in which [6γθ− a− 5βγθ] ≤ 0 for α ≥ 0. Then we must have (6γθ− a)/5 < βγθ. Since
βγθ < a, we also have 6γθ − a)/5 < a and so γθ < a. Similarly, consider Eq. (14) and
rewrite it as
[3a+ 6βθ− 9βγθ] − 4α(a− βγθ) = 0.
We must have [3a+6βθ−9βγθ] ≥ 0 for α ≥ 0. Then it follows that βγθ ≤ (a+2βθ)/3 = p,
which must be less than a. By setting p < a we get βθ < a. In sum, we have βγθ < a,
βθ < a and γθ < a.
2. Set α = 0 in Eqs. (13) and (14) and obtain
5γθ(1− β) − (a− γθ) = 0
(a− γθ) − 3βθ(γ− 1) = 0.
It follows that γ > 1 and β < 1.
3. Set α = 1 in Eqs. (13) and (14) and write
βγθ[5βγθ+ a](1− β) + (a− βγθ)(a+ 2βγθ = 0
6βθ(1− γ) − (a− βγθ) = 0.
From the above it is clear that β > 1 and γ < 1.
4. Consider unilateral delegations and two extreme cases of bargaining – only the share-
holders delegating with α = 0 and only the unions delegating with α = 1. From the
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shareholders’ delegation we get β = (6θ − a)/5θ and from the union’s delegation we get
symmetrically γ = (6θ− a)/5θ. For these γ and β to be positive we must have a < 6θ.
5. It is also evident from Eq. (14) that regardless of β the union’s best response is γ = 1
when α = 3/4. This .
6. Suppose only the shareholders delegate; that is set γ = 1 in Eq. (13). We see that at
α = (a−θ)θ
(a+θ)2−4θ2
the shareholders’ best response is β = 1. Since β ′(α) > 0 under unilateral
delegation, we can assert that at α > (<) (a−θ)θ
(a+θ)2−4θ2
optimal β > (<)1.
7. From Eq. (14) write the union’s reaction function as
γ =
a(3− 4α)
(9− 4α)βθ
+
6
9− 4α
.
It is clear that at all α > (<)3/4, ∂γ∂β > (<)0. That is, above α = 3/4, the union perceives
β as strategic complement to γ, and below α = 3/4, as strategic substitute for γ. That
is to say, the strategic relationship between the two incentive terms is not uniform, when
both the shareholders and the unions delegate. The shareholders’ incentive β is also not
always strategic substitute to γ; however the analytical expression is not helpful enough
to establish this clearly. When we present the simulation data, these issues may become
somewhat clear.
Now we would like to see if the strategic underproduction condition (10) holds for the
example we are considering. Substituting |∂si∂lj | = li,
∂lj
∂βiγi
= θ3 and the expression for wi and
then imposing symmetry we rewrite Eq. (10) as
α
a
βγθ
+ 3 > α+ β. (15)
It is not immediately obvious whether this condition will hold for any α. Some careful scrutiny
allows us to claim that if the joint incentive βγ is monotonic (either non-decreasing or non-
increasing) then it will be always greater than 1, and strategic underproduction would occur in
both firms. The following proposition states this formally.
Proposition 5 (Underproduction) Suppose the demand curve is linear in two homogenous
goods, and the production technology is constant returns to scale. Further, assume βγ(α) is
monotonic in α. Then βγ > 1 at all α ∈ [0, 1].
Next, verify if the condition for bargaining pie maximization holds for our example. The
pie maximization condition Eq. (12) reduces to βγ = 1+ qθ (using q
′(l) = 1 and p ′(qi) = −1).
Since q = (a− βγ)/3, we get βγ = (a+ 3θ)/4θ. Clearly, this is strictly less than a, and hence
within the feasible range of βγ.
Now it remains to be seen at what value of α, we get βγ = (a+ 3θ)/4θ, and how profit and
union’s utility vary with the union’s bargaining power. For this we resort to simulation.
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3.1 Simulation
Table 1 shows the computations of the equilibrium incentives and outputs for a = 2 and
θ = 1. First we consider the no delegation case (Case 0). Bargaining power affects only the
distribution of the bargaining pie, but leaves output and the (firm-level) pie unaffected. The
aggregate duopoly pie for the industry is 2 × 0.111= 0.222. The monopoly pie would be 0.25.
Next, Case 1 presents unilateral delegation by the shareholders. At α = (a−θ)θ
(a+θ)2−4θ2
= 19−4 =
0.2 optimal β is exactly 1. Above α = 0.2, β is greater than 1 causing underemployment
relative to Case 0, and below α = 0.2, β < 1 causing over-employment. It is also noteworthy
that profit rises above the no-delegation level only after β exceeds 1. That is, at α < 0.2
managers are oriented to sales maximization, and since both firms do the same, the outcome
is overproduction and loss in profit. In other words, in this range of α delegation suffers from
a prisoner’s dilemma problem. On the other hand, at α > 0.2 managers are oriented to profit
maximization and underproduction helps to improve profit; delegation pays off.
Case 2 describes unilateral delegation by the union. Above α = 0.75, the union leader is
oriented to gross wage bill maximization, which leads to overproduction (relative to the no-
delegation level) in both firms. Both unions are consequently worse off, a prisoner’s dilemma
phenomenon similar to the firm-side delegation (Case 1) at α < 0.2. Below α = 0.75 unions
orient their leaders to net wage bill maximization (γ > 1), which in turn helps to reduce
employment below the no-delegation level resulting in higher utility.
Finally, Case 3 concerns bilateral delegation. Here, at α < 0.22 the shareholders adopt sales
orientation (β∗ < 1) and above α = 0.22 they adopt profit orientation. The unions continue
to have gross wage bill orientation (as expected) above α = 0.75 and net wage bill orientation
below α = 0.75. The combined impact of these incentives on employment can be seen from the
column for βγ and l. βγ remains greater than 1 and steadily decreases with α; consequently
employment increases with α.
Further, profit increases and union’s utility decreases with an increase in α. Profit under
bilateral delegation is strictly increasing in α; in particular profit exceeds the no-delegation level
at α = 0.43 (compare Case 0 with Case 3). On the other hand, union’s utility from delegation
is strictly decreasing in α, but it remains above the duopoly level at all α ≤ 0.52. Thus, there
is a range of α, i.e. (0.43, 0.52), over which both parties experience strictly positive gains from
delegation.
Mutual benefits of (bilateral) delegation imply that the pie must have expanded. Indeed
that is the case over the entire range of α. This can be directly confirmed by comparing pi+u of
Case 3 with that of Case 0. Fig. 1 presents a visual illustration. The no-delegation pie is given
by the flat line at 0.111, and the pie under bilateral delegation is inverted U-shaped. Not only
is it strictly greater than 0.111, but it equals the collusive pie at α = 0.42. Under unilateral
delegation also the pie exceeds the no-delegation level, and it reaches the collusive level – at
α = 0.25 when only the unions delegate and at α = 4/5 when only the shareholders delegate.
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The pie maximization condition Eq. (12) reduces to βγ = 1 + qθ (using q
′(.) = 1 and
p ′(.) = −1). Since q = (a− βγ)/3, we get βγ = (a+ 3θ)/4θ.
Substituting a = 2 and θ = 1 we get the pie-maximizing βγ or k as 1.25. From Table 1
we can verify that βγ = 1.25 at α = 0.42 (Case 3) and the pie is half of the monopoly (no-
delegation) pie. For the other two cases of delegation as well we can identify α corresponding
to β or γ equal to 1.25.
Next, we comment on the strategic relationship between symmetric β and γ. As observed
earlier, we indeed have asymmetric relationship. From the union’s perspective β is strategic
complement to γ at all α > 0.75, and strategic substitute at all α < 0.75. From the firm’s
perspective γ is strategic substitute to β at all α > 0.2 and strategic complement at all α < 0.2.
So only at α ∈ (0.2, 0.75) they are strategic substitutes to each other. These can be read from
Table 1 by tracking the movements in β and γ between unilateral delegation and bilateral
delegation.
We summarize the key findings of this section with the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Payoff-power inverse relationship) Suppose the demand curve is linear in
two homogenous goods, and the production technology is constant returns to scale. Then there
exists a critical value of α such that the bargaining pie is maximized in each firm and it is equal
to the collusive pie. Furthermore, the firm’s (union’s) payoff is positively (negatively) related to
the union’s bargaining power α.
3.2 Decision to Delegate or not Delegate
We can extend the game backward to add a stage where both sides decide to delegate or
not delegate by looking ahead at the symmetric equilibrium payoffs from the ensuing game.
Potentially this would be a larger game involving four players. To simplify this we assume that
shareholders of both firms come together and coordinate only their delegation decision, but
their subsequent interactions will be fully non-cooperative as modeled in the paper. Similarly,
unions of the two firms coordinate their delegation decisions, though subsequently they will act
independently. This is a sort of semi-collusive game12 and it can be suggested as follows.
• Stage 1: Suppose two firms jointly decide whether to delegate or not – a ‘yes-no’ decision;
simultaneously the unions jointly decide whether to delegate or not. That is, both firms and
both unions share the same delegation decision.
• Stage 2: Firms part company and so do the unions. If firms had decided ‘yes’ in stage 1,
they independently hire their managers. Likewise, if unions decided ‘yes’ in the first stage, they
would independently hire their union leaders.
• Stage 3: Each firm and union independently set their incentive terms (β1, γ1) and (β2, γ2).
This is a four-way decision.
12Semi-collusion has been studied in many contexts. For example, Fershtman and Gandal (1994) studied
collusion in the output market preceded by competition in R&D stage.
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• Stage 4: The manager and the union leader in each firm bargain over employment and
wage. If, in stage 1, one side (or both sides) had decided not to delegate, then in stage 4, the
shareholders or the union will directly participate in decision making.
This allows us to compress the extended game as a two-player game in the first stage, and
we can restrict our attention to the union and the shareholders of one firm only. By modeling
the delegation decision in this way, we can easily solve the game.
Ideally, we need to consider the whole game in a fully non-cooperative spirit where the
decision to delegate is independently taken by each firm and each union in stage 1, looking
ahead all possible sub-games. But solving this game would require analyzing a large number
of asymmetric cases, a tenuous task, needless to say without any clear benefit. Even in this
very large game, one equilibrium path will be the symmetric payoffs with symmetric delegation
decisions that we are focusing on in our smaller semi-collusive game.
Tables 2a-2c report the payoff matrices at three values of α, 0.8, 0.5 and 0.1 respectively. It
turns out that at all α > 0.75 the shareholders find delegation a dominant strategy while the
unions find no-delegation as their dominant strategy. Thus, we have an outcome of asymmetric
delegation with only the weaker party delegating. The outcome is reversed when α < 0.22; here,
the shareholders being very strong abstain from delegation. At α ∈ (0.22, 0.75) both parties
delegate. Fig. 2 depicts the equilibrium delegation decisions. At α = 0.75 (alternatively 0.22)
the union (alternatively shareholders) is indifferent between delegation and no-delegation.
Thus, we see an interesting scenario. When the players are most powerful on the bargaining
front, they do not resort to delegation, their within-firm rival tries to cover their weakness in
negotiation by resorting to strong bargaining oriented delegation. Production is consequently
restrained below the duopoly level. This contradicts the premise of the majority of the strategic
delegation models, where shareholders (assuming the most bargaining power against the work-
ers) unilaterally delegate inducing overproduction. But we see that if their decision to delegate
is made endogenous (as seen for α < 0.22), they would not have delegated at all. So the scenario
commonly assumed in the managerial incentive literature, may not arise in a larger game.
4 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have developed a model of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bar-
gaining in duopoly. Shareholders in each firm appoint a manager to negotiate on their behalf,
and so do the workers by appointing a union leader. We first characterize and then compute (for
an example) the optimal equilibrium incentive schemes. The combined impact of the sharehold-
ers’ incentives and the workers’ incentives is underemployment restraining production below the
Cournot-Nash duopoly level. This acts like implicit collusion, as the bargaining pie expands
(from the no-delegation level), and opportunities for mutual gains are created. But each player’s
payoff will be inversely related to his bargaining power. It may not be unfair to say that strong
unions may facilitate firm collusion as much as strong firms facilitate union cooperation. In
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Table 1: Duopoly simulations
a = 2; θ = 1
Case 0: No Delegation (β = 1; γ = 1)
α l u pi pi + u
1 0.333 0.111 0 0.111
0.75 0.333 0.083 0.028 0.111
0.5 0.333 0.056 0.056 0.111
0.42 0.333 0.056 0.056 0.111
0.25 0.333 0.028 0.083 0.111
0.20 0.333 0.222 0.89 0.111
0 0.333 0 0.111 0.111
Case 1: Only shareholders delegates ( γ = 1)
α β l u pi pi + u
1 1.29 0.235 0.0427 0.0819 0.12455
0.8 1.25 0.251 0.0406 0.0844 0.12500
0.75 1.23 0.256 0.0399 0.0851 0.12493
0.5 1.15 0.283 0.0349 0.0879 0.12278
0.25 1.03 0.323 0.0252 0.0892 0.11441
0.22 1.01 0.329 0.0234 0.0890 0.11241
0.2 1 0.333 0.0222 0.0889 0.11111
0.1 0.92 0.360 0.0140 0.0869 0.10097
0 0.80 0.4 0 0.08 0.08
Case 2: Only union delegates ( β = 1)
α γ l u pi pi + u
1 0.8 0.4 0.08 0 0.08
0.8 0.97 0.345 0.0832 0.0238 0.1070
0.75 1 0.333 0.0833 0.0278 0.1111
0.5 1.14 0.286 0.0816 0.0408 0.1224
0.25 1.25 0.250 0.0781 0.0469 0.1250
0.22 1.26 0.246 0.0776 0.0473 0.1249
0.2 1.27 0.244 0.0773 0.0476 0.1249
0.1 1.30 0.233 0.0757 0.0487 0.1244
0 1.33 0.222 0.0741 0.0494 0.1235
Case 3: Both delegate
α β γ βγ l u pi pi + u
1 1.35 0.904 1.220 0.2599 0.0248 0.100 0.12480
0.8 1.26 0.980 1.230 0.2568 0.037 0.088 0.12491
0.75 1.23 1.0 1.232 0.2559 0.0399 0.085 0.12493
0.5 1.12 1.112 1.245 0.2516 0.057 0.068 0.12500
0.42 1.08 1.12 1.25 0.2501 0.062 0.063 0.12500
0.25 1.01 1.244 1.260 0.2467 0.075 0.050 0.12498
0.22 1 1.261 1.261 0.2463 0.078 0.047 0.12497
0.2 0.99 1.272 1.263 0.2457 0.079 0.046 0.12496
0.1 0.95 1.332 1.269 0.2436 0.087 0.038 0.12492
0 0.91 1.396 1.276 0.2414 0.096 0.029 0.12485
Table 2a. Payoff matrix for =0.8 
 Shareholders 
 
Union 
 Not delegate Delegate 
Not delegate 0.0888, 0.0222 0.0406, 0.0844 
Delegate 0.0832, 0.0237 0.0367, 0.0881 
Outcome: Union does not delegate, Shareholders delegate. 
 
 
 
Table 2b. Payoff matrix for=0.5 
 Shareholders 
 
Union 
 Not delegate Delegate 
Not delegate 0.056,   0.056 0.0349, 0.0879 
Delegate 0.0816, 0.0408 0.057,   0.068 
Outcome: Both parties delegate. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2c. Payoff matrix for=0.1 
 Shareholders 
 
Union 
 Not delegate Delegate 
Not delegate 0.0111, 0.10 0.0140, 0.0869 
Delegate 0.0757, 0.0487 0.0872, 0.0376 
Outcome: Union delegates, Shareholders don’t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unions delegate,        Shareholders delegate, 
Shareholders don’t      Both delegate     Unions don’t  
_____________|___________________________|_____________  
0          0.22                  0.75                  1 
 
 
   Figure 2. Decision to delegate 
   
either case, the industry outcome is nearly a collusive one. Because of delegation intra-firm
conflicts help inter-firm cooperation.
Our analysis has abstracted from capital. It is not unreasonable to expect that capital will
remain outside the union’s negotiation. It remains to be seen whether that will help or hinder
the shareholders. There are other issues such as the union’s objective function. What if the
union attaches different weight on employment than on wage? Some asymmetric cases might
also be interesting - for example absence of union in one firm depicting a contrast between union
and non-union sector. We believe that insights developed in this paper will go a long way in
exploring such related issues.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
By definition β∗ is the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium incentive scheme, which is
obvious from the discussion preceding the statement of the proposition. To see that βS < β∗
consider (7). Set α = 0 and solve for β; this gives βS. Clearly as ∂si∂lj < 0,
∂lj
∂βi
> 0 and
∂li
∂βi
< 0 , we must have βS < 1. Now plug back βS in (7), but revert back to α > 0. The
first (bracketed) term is clearly zero at βS, but the second (bracketed) term is strictly positive.
Hence, for equation (7) to hold, β must be increased above βS. Since by definition β∗ satisfies
(7), β∗ > βS.
Now for the upper bound on β∗ set α = 1 in Eq. (7), which allows for the smallest strategic
effect. Solve for β. This gives βB. Since, for pi = si(.)(1−
α
βi
−(1−α)θγili to be strictly positive
(for delegation to be profitable) at all α we must have β > 1 when α = 1. Hence, βB must
exceed 1. Now reconsider (7) and substitute β = βB at any arbitrary α < 1. The second term
is now bigger in magnitude. Hence for equality to hold, the first term must remain positive and
rise in magnitude, which requires reducing the negative part of the first term, i.e. reducing β
below βB (because ∂si∂li < 0). Thus, we must have β
∗ < βB.
Finally, for the comparative statics with respect to α one derives from the first order condi-
tion of firm i = 1, 2,
∂2pii
∂β2i
β∗i
′(α) +
∂2pii
∂βi∂βj
β∗j
′(α) +
∂2pii
∂βi∂α
= 0, (16)
∂2pij
∂βj∂βi
β∗i
′(α) +
∂2pij
∂β2j
β∗j
′(α) +
∂2pii
∂βj∂α
= 0.
From (7) derive ∂
2pii
∂βi∂α
=
[
si −
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂βi
βi
]
> 0 for i, j, i 6= j.
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By the second order condition for profit maximization ∂
2pii
∂β2i
< 0 for both i, j. By the Cournot
stability condition ∂
2pii
∂β2i
∂2pij
∂β2j
> ∂
2pii
∂βi∂βj
∂2pij
∂βj∂βi
. By symmetry ∂
2pii
∂β2i
=
∂2pij
∂β2j
and ∂
2pii
∂βi∂βj
=
∂2pij
∂βj∂βi
.
Therefore, the stability condition implies |∂
2pii
∂β2i
| > | ∂
2pii
∂βi∂βj
|, which in turn yields ∂
2pii
∂β2i
+ ∂
2pii
∂βi∂βj
< 0.
Now consider (16). By symmetry β∗i
′(α) = β∗j
′(α) = β∗′(α), which can be obtained from
(16) as
β∗′(α) = −
∂2pii
∂βi∂α
∂2pii
∂β2i
+ ∂
2pii
∂βi∂βj
= −
[
si
β2i
− ∂si∂lj
∂lj
∂βi
1
βi
]
∂2pii
∂β2i
+ ∂
2pii
∂βi∂βj
> 0.
At α = 0, β∗ = βS < 1. At α = 1, β∗ = βB > 1. Therefore, as β∗ is continuous and
increasing in α, there exists a unique α, namely α^, at which β∗ = 1. At all α > α^ it is obvious
that β∗ > 1 and at all α < α^, β∗ < 1 due to the monotonicity of β∗.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. Fix βi = 1 in (8) for i = 1, 2. Then
by setting α = 0 and α = 1 obtain γB > 1 and γS < 1 respectively. To show that γS ≤ γ∗ ≤ γB
apply the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1. Next, by the continuity of γ there
must exist a critical α (α˜) such that γ∗(α˜) = 0. That α˜ is unique follows from the fact that
∂γ∗/∂α < 0, which we establish below.
Using symmetry we derive from Eq. (8) for i = 1, 2 and i 6= j,
γ∗′(α) = −
∂2ui
∂γi∂α
∂2ui
∂γ2i
+ ∂
2ui
∂γi∂γj
=
[
θli −
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂γi
1
βi
]
∂2ui
∂γ2i
+ ∂
2ui
∂γi∂γj
< 0.
Since ∂γ∗/∂α < 0 and γ∗(α = 0) = γB > 1 and γ∗(α = 1) = γS < 1, γ˜ must be unique, and at
all γ < (>)γ˜, γ∗ > (<)1.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Suppose ((β1, γ1), (β2, γ2)) is a Nash equilibrium and βi and γi are continuous functions
of α; hence they satisfy Eqs. (7) and (8) for i = 1, 2. Set α = 0 in (7) and (8). For (7) to hold
we must have βi < 1 (since ∂li/∂βi < 0) and for (8) to hold we must also have γi > 1 since
∂li/∂γi < 0. Then by continuity of βi and γi, at all sufficiently small α we will also have βi < 1
and γi > 1.
Next, set α = 1 in Eq. (8) from which we get γi < 1. From the expression of profit it
becomes clear that pii = si(.)(1 −
1
βi
) > 0 only if βi > 1. Again by continuity the same result
will hold at sufficiently high values of α close to 1.
(ii) Recall ∂pii/∂βi = 0 from Eq. (7)
(βi − 1)γiθ
∂li
∂βi
+
(
1−
α
βi
)
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂βi
+ α
si
β2i
= 0.
20
Substitute
∂lj
∂βi
=
∂lj
∂(βiγi)
γi for any i, j, and multiply both sides by βi we get
(βi − 1)γiθ
∂li
∂βiγi
βiγi +
(
1−
α
βi
)
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂βiγi
βiγi + α
si
βi
= 0. (17)
Similarly, consider ∂pii/∂γi = 0 from Eq. (8)
θ(γi − 1)
∂li
∂γi
+
α
βi
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂γi
+ (1− α)θli = 0.
Subsitute
∂lj
∂γi
=
∂lj
∂βiγi
βi (for any i and j) and multiply both sides by γi to get
(γi − 1)θ
∂li
∂(βiγi)
βiγi +
α
βi
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂βiγi
βiγi + (1− α)θγili = 0. (18)
Adding Eq. (17) to Eq. (18) we get
(βiγi − 1)θ
∂li
∂(βiγi)
βiγi +
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂βiγi
βiγi + α
si
βi
+ (1− α)θγili = 0
βiγi
[
(βiγi − 1)θ
∂li
∂(βiγi)
+
∂si
∂lj
∂lj
∂βiγi
+
wili
βiγi
]
= 0
which is precisely our Eq. (9). It is obvious from Eq. (9) that if condition (10) holds, then it
must be the case that βiγi > 1. Also, if βiγi > 1, condition (10) must hold.
Proof of the existence of the maximum pie
Consider Eq. (12). We would like to show that there exists a unique solution to this
equation. Let us write ψ ≡ 1− ∂si∂lj 1θ which is a function of βγ (rather than β and γ separately)
via li(.). We are looking for a solution to the equation βγ = ψ(βγ). Note that ∂si/∂lj is
positively related to βγ (see Footnote 11). Hence, ψ ′(βγ) = − 1θ
∂2si
∂lj∂βγ
< 0. Now, as βγ → 0,
ψ(.) → ∞ (due to qi → ∞), and as βγ → ∞, ψ(.) → 1 (due to qi → 0). On the other hand,
βγ is a 45-degree line. Hence, βγ must cross ψ(βγ) exactly once. In other words, there is a
unique solution of βγ to Eq. (12). Let this solution be denoted as k; clearly, k > 1.
It is also clear that regardless of the two-sided or one-sided delegations, as the function ψ(.)
does not change except for its argument, the condition for the bargaining pie maximization is
same. When only the shareholders delegate β must be equal to k (with γ = 1), and when only
the unions delegate we must have γ = k with β = 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
First, let us see if the underproduction condition (15) holds when α is zero (or close to zero).
When α = 0, the left hand side of condition (15) redues to 3, and the right hand side will be
strictly less than 1, because β(α = 0) < 1. So if the right hand side has to exceed the left hand
side, then β mut exceed 3. This means a/θ > 3 for that possibility to arise. Let us suppose
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that is the case. Suppose at α = 1 the above inequality is reversed, which implies that βγ < 1;
condition (15) is both necessary and sufficient condition for βγ > 1. So the inequality at α = 1
becomes
a
βγθ
+ 3 < 1+ β.
We know β < a/θ for any α. So the above inequality implies
a
βγθ
+ 3 < 1+ β < 1+
a
θ
.
But this is not possible. If βγ < 1, we should have aθ <
a
βγθ . Hence, this is a contradiction to
our claim that βγ < 1 at α = 1.
What if the inequality (15) was reversed at some α, 0 < α < 1? Suppose there exists an
interval of α, 0 < α0 < α1 < 1, such that at all α ∈ (α0, α1) the inequality (15) is reversed
implying βγ < 1. At all α < α0 and all α > α1 we have βγ > 1, with βγ(α0) = βγ(α1) = 1.
But this is a contradiction to our assumption that βγ is monotonic in α. Hence, we must have
βγ > 1 at all α.
REFERENCES
Basu K, Ghosh A, Ray T. 1997. The Babu and the Boxwallah: Managerial incentives and
government intervention in a developing economy. Review of Development Economics 1: 71-90.
Chatterjee I, Saha B. 2013. Bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in
monopoly. Economics Letters 120: 280-283.
Das SP. 1997. Strategic managerial delegation and trade policy. Journal of International
Economics 43: 173-88.
Fershtman C, Gandal N. 1994. Disadvantageous semicollusion. International Journal of
Industrial Organization 12: 141-154.
Fershtman C, Judd K. 1987. Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly. American Economic
Review, 77: 927-40.
Haskel J, Martin C. 1992. Margins, concentration, unions and the business cycle: Theory
and evidence from Britain. International Journal of Industrial Organization 10: 611-632.
Jones SRG. 1989a. Role of negotiators in union-firm bargaining. Canadian Journal of
Economics 22: 630-642.
Jones SRG. 1989b. Have your lawyer call my lawyer: Bilateral delegation in bargaining
situations. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 11: 159-174.
Kasinec DT. 2006. How does your output grow? MGMA Connexion February, http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi qa4083/is 200602/ai n17180069, accessed on September 20, 2015.
Lambertini L, Trombetta M. 2002. Delegation and firms’ ability to collude. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 47:359-73.
22
McDonald I, Solow R. 1981. Wage bargaining and employment. American Economic Review
71: 896-908.
Mujumdar S, Pal D. 2007. Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly.
Games and Economic Behavior 58: 338-353.
Mukherjee A, Tsai YS. 2014. Managerial delegation, cost asymmetry and social efficiency
of entry. Economic Record 90: 90-97.
Singh P, Agarwal N. 2002. Union presence and executive compensation: An exploratory
study. Journal of labour Research 23: 631-646.
Sklivas S. 1987. The strategic choice of management incentives. RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics 18: 452-458.
Szymanski S. 1994. Strategic delegation with endogenous costs: A duopoly with wage
bargaining. International Journal of Industrial Organization 12: 105-16.
Vickers J. 1985. Delegation and the theory of the firm. The Economic Journal, Supplement
95: 138-147.
Zhang J, Zhang Z. 1997. R&D in a strategic delegation game. Managerial and Decision
Economics 18:391-398.
23
